The distribution of human capital and income lies at the center of a nexus of forces that shape a country's economic, institutional and technological structure. I develop here a unified model to analyze these interactions and their growth consequences. Five main issues are addressed. First, I identify the key factors that make both European-style "welfare state" and US-style "laissez-faire" social contracts sustainable.; I also compare the growth rates of these two politico-economic steady states, which are no Pareto-rankable.
Introduction
The distribution of human capital and income lies at the center of a nexus of forces that shape a country's economic, institutional and technological structure. This chapter develops a unified model to analyze these interactions and their implications for growth, emphasizing in particular the mechanisms that allow different socioeconomic structures to perpetuate themselves, and those pushing toward convergence. 1 The analysis centers around five main questions.
1. Why do countries at similar levels of development choose widely different social contracts? Redistribution -through taxes and transfers, unemployment and health insurance, education finance and labor market regulation-displays remarkable variations even among countries with similar economic and political fundamentals. I thus ask what makes both European-type welfare states and US-type, more laissez-faire social contracts sustainable in the long run, together with their respective levels of inequality.
2 I then examine the efficiency and growth properties of these two regimes (which cannot be Pareto ranked) and ask what shocks might cause each one to unravel. The model also sheds light on the contrasting historical development paths of North and South America, and on the more recent experience of East Asia versus Latin America.
How does skill-biased technical and organizational change impact the viability of redistributive institutions?
Over the last twenty-five years, most industrialized countries experienced a considerable rise in wage inequality. 3 This trend is generally attributed to three main factors: skill-biased technical change, international trade (which lies outside the scope of this chapter), and institutional change, such as the erosion of the minimum wage and the decline of unions. But minimum wages, labor market legislation and union power are endogenous outcomes, to the same extent as social insurance and education policy; and indeed, they evolved quite differently in Continental Europe or Canada and in the United States. 4 Analyzing redistributive institutions as a whole, I show how skill-biased technical change can cause the welfare state to unravel, and examine more generally how technological evolutions affect the set of social contracts that can be sustained in the long run.
The previous questions aim to explain differences in redistributive policies (together with their economic implications) and the role of technology in their evolution. The next two take the reverse perspective.
processes -and in particular their degree of skill bias-are themselves endogenous, adapting over time to the skills of the labor force. 5 I develop here a new and very tractable model of technology choice, based on the idea that firms tailor the flexibility of their production processes (substitutability between different labor inputs) to the distribution of human capital in the workforce. The main prediction is that the more heterogenous are workers' skill levels, the more flexible and wage-disequalizing the equilibrium technology will be. In a country like Japan, by contrast, production will involve much tighter complementarity between workers' tasks. Integrating this model with the previous analysis of human capital dynamics, I also show that firms' choices involve externalities that tend to result in excessive flexibility and a suboptimal growth rate, or even in self-sustaining technology-inequality traps.
4. What types of societies and institutions are most conducive to the emergence of skill-biased technologies and organizational forms? Through their influence on the distribution of human capital, public policies in the fiscal, labor market and especially educational arenas are important determinants of what innovations can be profitably developed and adopted; the same is true for immigration. One notes, for instance, that skill-biased technical change and reorganization occurred first, and to a greater extent, in the United States compared to Europe -and within the latter, more so in England than on the Continent. Combining the technology and policy components of the model, I show how a world-wide shift in the technological frontier leads to different evolutions of production processes and skill premia across countries with different social contracts.
Two extensive but essentially disconnected literatures have examined the economic determinants and consequences of redistributive policies on the one hand, those of biased technical change on the other. 6 Yet in reality both are endogenous, and jointly determined. The ability to conduct a unified analysis of human capital dynamics, technology and institutions is a novel and key feature of the framework developed in this chapter. It makes it possible to address important questions such as the second, fourth and especially fifth ones on the list:
5. What "societal models" -joint configurations of technology, inequality, and policy-are feasible in the long run? In particular, how does the diffusion of technology affect nations' ability to maintain their own redistributive institutions and social structures? Analyzing the case of two countries linked by the (endogenous) diffusion of their domestically developed technologies, I show how inequality 5 See, e.g., Kremer and Maskin (1996) , Acemoglu (1998) , Kiley (1999) , Lloyd-Ellis (1999) , and Vindigni (1992) . Relatedly, Grossman and Maggi (2000) show how the skill distribution matters for international specialization, and Legros and Newman (1996) how the wealth distribution affects the organization of firms.
6 See the previously cited references, as well as the other ones given throughout the paper.
tends to be "exported" to the less heterogeneous one. This mechanism, in turn, generates spillovers between the social contracts of different nations, transmitting even purely political shocks and potentially triggering "chain reactions" that can cause major shifts towards a common, and generally inegalitarian, outcome.
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Figure 1: The links between inequality, technology and redistributive institutions
The chapter is organized in two main parts, corresponding respectively to the left-and right-hand sides of Figure 1 . 7 The first of these two feedback loops centers on political-economy interactions. I thus present in Sections I and II a model of inequality, growth and redistributive policy in a context of imperfect credit and insurance markets (based on Bénabou (2000) ). I first analyze how macro and distributional dynamics are affected by redistributive policies, then how the latter are themselves determined from the preferences and political power of different social classes. Finally, I identify the conditions under which a single or multiple politico-economic steady states arise.
The second and most novel part of the chapter incorporates the role of technology and its interactions with redistributive institutions. I first consider in Section III the impact of exogenous skill-biased technical change on inequality and the political equilibrium. I then study how technology responds to the composition of the labor force, through firms' choice of their degree of flexibility. In Section IV both sides of Figure I are brought together to analyze the long-run determination of institutions, technologies and the distribution of human capital. In Section V, finally, I show how technology diffusion leads to the "exporting" of inequality and international spillovers between social contracts. Section VI concludes. All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
7 Each arrow on the diagram actually corresponds to a specific equation or proposition in the model. From left to right, these are (11), Proposition 3, (1) or later (28), and Proposition 8. 
I Inequality, Redistribution, and Growth
The model presented in this section (drawing on Bénabou (2000)) can be summarized by two key relationships between inequality and redistribution; both arise from imperfections in credit and insurance markets, and are illustrated on Figure 2 .
The first locus summarizes the political mechanism: in each period, the equilibrium rate of redistribution chosen by voters is a U-shaped function τ = T (∆) of inequality in human capital, measured here as the variance of a lognormal distribution. The downward-sloping part of this curve, which is the crucial one, reflects a very general intuition: while asset market imperfections create a scope for efficient redistributive institutions (to provide social insurance and relax credit constraints), these institutions command much less support in an unequal society than in a relatively homogeneous one. Thus, starting from ∆ = 0, where there is unanimous support for the ex-ante efficient degree of redistribution, growing inequality increases the fraction of agents rich enough to lose from, and therefore oppose, all but relatively low levels of τ . The upward-sloping part of the curve, in contrast, is shaped by the standard skewness effect, which eventually dominates: rising numbers of poor will eventually impose more redistribution, well beyond the point where it ceases to be efficient.
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The second curve on Figure 2 represents the accumulation mechanism: since redistribution relaxes the credit constraints bearing on the poor's human capital investments, long-run inequality is a declining function ∆ = T (τ ) of the rate of redistribution. When the two curves have several intersections, as illustrated on the figure, these correspond to multiple politico-economic steady states that are sustainable under the same fundamentals. One, with low inequality and high redistribution, corresponds to a Europeantype welfare state; the other, with the reverse configuration, to a US-type, more laissez-faire society.
In this and the next section I will derive the two loci from an explicit dynamic model, and identify the configurations of economic and political parameters under which alternative social models can coexist.
In later sections I shall investigate how the two curves, and therefore the equilibrium set, are affected by exogenous technical change, then ultimately extend the analysis to the case where technology itself adapts endogenously to the distribution of skills in the population.
A Production, Preferences and Policy
The economy is populated by overlapping-generations families, i ∈ [0, 1]. In generation t, adult i combines his human capital k i t with effort l i t to produce output, subject to a productivity shock z i t :
This recursive specification allows a to parametrize the insurance value of redistributive policies, just as the labor supply elasticity 1/(η − 1) parametrizes the effort distortions.
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The redistributive policies over which agents vote are represented by simple, progressive schemes that map a market income y i t (marginal revenue product) into a disposable incomeŷ i t , according to:
The break-even levelỹ t is determined by the balanced-budget constraint, which requires that net transfers sum to zero. Thus, denoting per capita income by y t , it must be that:
The elasticity τ t measures the degree of progressivity, or equalization, of redistributive institutions.
12 9 The absence of any intertemporal trade is clearly an oversimplified (but quite common) representation of asset market incompleteness, making the model analytically tractable. Zhang (2004) extends a simplified version of the present model (with a zero-one policy variable and no political-economy mechanism) to allow for physical capital and financial bequests. He obtains similar results for the effects of inequality, plus new ones on convergence speeds to the steady-state.
10 His (relative) risk-aversion with respect to the child's endowment k i t+1 at that stage is normalized to zero, but this plays no role in any of the results. A dynastic specification of preferences (Bénabou (2002) ) also leads to similar aggregate and distributional dynamics, but is less simple to work with.
11 When a 6 = 1 these recursive preferences are not time-separable (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1979) ), as risk-aversion differs from the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, which by (4) remains fixed at one. This last assumption, common to many papers in the literature, helps make the model analytically solvable.
12 When τ t > 0 the marginal rate rises with pretax income, and agents with average income are made better off:ỹt > yt. The elasticity of aftertax to pretax income is indeed the "right" measure of equalization: the posttax distribution induced by a fiscal scheme Lorenz-dominates the one induced by another (for all pretax distributions), if and only if the first scheme's elasticity is everywhere smaller (Fellman (1976) ).
Three types of redistributive mechanisms can be considered here, being close to formally equivalent in this model. The first one, on which the exposition will generally focus, is that of fiscal policy, which equalizes disposable incomes through taxes and transfers. A second is wage or earnings compression through labor market institutions and policies favorable to workers with relatively low skills: minimum wage laws, unionfriendly or right-to-strike regulations, firing costs, public sector pay and employment, etc. 13 The third one is education finance, where τ t now applies only to human capital expenditures e i t , as opposed to all of income y i t . This may be achieved through a policy of school funding equalization across local communities, the presence of a centrally financed public-education system, or more generally by subsidizing differentially the education of rich and poor students.
14 Under either of the three above interpretations of τ t , incentive compatibility requires that τ t ≤ 1; on the other hand a regressive policy τ t < 0 cannot be ruled out a priori, and indeed one does observe such policies, typically in countries characterized by high inequality and a powerful ruling class.
B Distributional Dynamics and Aggregate Growth
Taking policy as parametrically given for the moment, I first consider the resulting economic decisions of individual agents, then the economy-wide dynamics of human capital and income.
Proposition 1 Given a rate of redistribution τ t , agents in generation t choose a common labor supply and savings rate: l t = χ (1−τ t ) 1/η and e The fact that savings are unaffected is due to the imperfect-altruism assumption made regarding preferences. 15 Labor supply, on the other hand, declines in τ t with an elasticity of 1/η, and this single distortion will suffice to demonstrate how the efficiency costs and benefits of redistributive institutions shape the set of politico-economic equilibria.
Given Proposition 1, and substituting (6) into (3), the law of motion for human wealth is loglinear:
13 With the "autarkic" production function (1) the equivalence between the wage-income-equalization and the fiscalredistribution interpretations of τ t is immediate. It continues to hold when we move in Section III.B to a richer production structure with interacting agents.
14 See Bénabou (2000) for this version of the model. Some of the formulas change slightly from those presented here for fiscal policy, but without affecting the qualitative nature of any of the results. There are, on the other hand, important quantitative differences between the growth and welfare implications of the two policies; see Bénabou (2002) and Sheshadri and Yuki (2004) for comparative analyzes. Previous models of redistribution centering on education finance include Becker (1964) , Loury (1981) , Glomm and Ravilkumar (1992) , Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) , Bénabou (1996b) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) . On the empirical side, see Krueger (2002) for a comprehensive summary and discussion of the evidence on targeted education and training policy interventions, from preschool to the college level. 15 In Bénabou (2002) I develop and calibrate a version of the present model with dynastic preferences, where τ t does affect the savings rate. On the other hand, agents are then able (and will indeed want) to use additional policy instruments, such as consumption taxes and investment subsidies, to alleviate this distortion.
This linearity reflects the absence of any non-convexities in the model, making clear that the multiplicity of equilibria will arise solely through the general-equilibrium feedback from the income distribution onto the political determination of τ t .
16 These simple conditional dynamics also imply that human capital and income always remain lognormally distributed across agents:
where m t and ∆ 2 t evolve according to two simple linear difference equations obtained by taking means and variances in (8), and given in the appendix. Since the growth of mean income y t is of more direct economic interest than that of mean log-income m t , I present here the equivalent characterization of the economy's dynamic path in terms of two linear difference equations in ∆ 2 t and ln
Proposition 2 The distributions of human capital and income at time t are given by (9)- (10), where
1/η . The evolution of inequality across generations is governed by
and the growth rate of aggregate income by:
where lnκ ≡ γ(ln κ + β ln s) − γ(1 − γ)w 2 /2 is a constant and
Equation (11) shows how inequality in the next generation stems from three sources: the varying abilities of children (w 2 ), shocks to family income (v 2 ), and differences in parental human capital (∆ 2 t ), which matter both through family income and at-home transmission. Redistribution equalizes the disposable resources available to finance educational investments (but not social backgrounds), thus limiting both cross-sectional inequality and the persistence of family wealth, α + βγ(1 − τ t ); conversely, it increases social mobility. Equation (12) makes apparent the growth losses from inequality due to credit constraints, and how redistribution's impact on growth involves a tradeoff between incentive and investment-allocation effects.
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16 Or / and a feedback from the distribution onto the technology γ, once it is endogenized later on. By contrast, nearly all models in the literature that feature multiple equilibria rely on investment thresholds (e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993) , Banerjee and Newman (1993) ), indivisibilities in effort (Piketty (1997) ), or non-homotheticity in preferences (e.g., Moav (2002) ). For a discussion of indivisibilities, see also Mookerjee and Ray (2003) . 17 See Bénabou (1996b) for an overview of the literature on the relationship between inequality and growth, which is not the main focus of the present paper. In particular, inequality can also have positive effects on growth when there are non-The effort distortion corresponds to the term in δ, which declines with parallel increases in τ t and τ t+1 . The reallocation of human capital investments across differentially wealth-constrained agents is captured by the terms in L v (τ t ) and L ∆ (τ t ). When α = 0 both are equal, and proportional to the concavity βγ(1−βγ) of the common accumulation technology facing all families: differences in parental human capital and productivity shocks simply combine into variations in disposable income,
, which credit constraints then translate into inefficient variations in investment, reducing overall growth proportionately. When α > 0, however, disparate family backgrounds k i t represent complementary inputs that generate differential returns to investment, thus reducing the desirability of equalizing resources. Thus L ∆ (τ ) now differs from L v (τ ), and is minimized for τ = (1 − α − βγ)/(1 − βγ), which decreases with α.
The term in − ln y t in the growth equation, finally, reflects the standard convergence effect. It disappears under constant aggregate returns, namely when α + βγ = 1, or when the constant κ in (3) is replaced by a knowledge spillover such as
This last variant yields an endogenous-growth version of the model, where all the predictions obtained with a constant κ in (12) now directly transpose from short-run growth and long-run per capita income to long-term growth rates.
Are the potential growth-enhancing effects of redistributive policies in the presence of credit constraints significant, or trivial compared to the standard deadweight losses? While the answer must ultimately come from empirical studies of specific policy programs or experiments, recent quantitative models suggest very important long-run effects, ranging from several percentage points of steady-state GDP to several percentage points of long-run growth, depending on the presence of accumulated factors, such as physical capital or knowledge spillovers, that complement individual human capital. Calibrating to US data a model with neither effort distortions nor complementarities, Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) find that complete school finance equalization raises long-run GDP by 3.2 %. In a model with both educational and financial bequests, Sheshadri and Yuki (2004) find that a mix of fiscal and educational redistribution that approximates current US policies raises long-run income by 13.5%, relative to laissez-faire. This more substantial impact primarily reflects the induced adjustment of physical capital, but it remains a level effect due to decreasing returns to the two types of capital together. In a dynastic-utility version of the present model with endogenous growth (Bénabou (2002) ) I find that the growth-maximizing value for fiscal redistribution is τ fisc = 21%, which corresponds to a share of redistributive transfers in GDP of 6%; in spite of reduced labor supply this raises the long-run growth rate by 0.5 percentage points. Under convexities in either the investment technology (e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993) ) or in preferences (e.g., Galor and Moav (1999) ). For recent contributions to the empirical debate, see Forbes (2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) .
the alternative policy of progressive education finance, the growth-maximizing equalization rate for school expenditures is τ educ = 62%, which raises long-run growth by 2.4 percentage points. In both cases, the efficient policy involves the top 30% of families subsidizing the bottom 70%, whether through the fiscal or the education system.
C Voter Preferences, Political Power, and Equilibrium Policy
I now turn to the determination of policy, which reflects both individual citizens' preferences and the allocation of power in the political system. In each generation, before the productivity shocks z i t are realized, agents vote on the rate of redistribution τ t to which they will be subject; again, this could be through the fiscal system, labor market regulation, or education finance. Applying Propositions 1 and 2 to equations (4)- (5), an individual i's intertemporal welfare U i t can be computed from (5) as a function of the proposed policy τ t , his endowment k i t , and the overall distribution of human capital (m t , ∆ t ), which is the system's state variable.
18 Defining the composite efficiency parameter
whose interpretation is is given below, the resulting first-order condition for agent i's ideal tax rate takes the form:
The first term inside the brackets, which disappears when summing across agents, reflects the basic redistributive conflict: since τ t reallocates resources (spent on both consumption and children's education) from rich to poor households, the latter want it to be high, and the former, low. The next two terms represent the aggregate welfare cost and aggregate welfare benefit of a marginal increase in τ t . First, there is the deadweight loss due to the distortion in effort: it is proportional to the labor supply elasticity 1/η, and vanishes at τ = 0. Second, the term
, which is maximized for τ t = 1, embodies the (marginal) efficiency gains that arise from better insurance and the redistribution of resources towards more severely credit-constrained investments. Indeed it is clear from (14) that the composite parameter B multiplying the variance of adults' income shocks v 2 is monotonically related to both risk-aversion a and to the extent of decreasing returns in human-capital investment, 1 − β. 19 As to initial income inequality, the term γ 2 ∆ 2 t reflects two motives for redistribution. 20 First, relaxing preexisting credit constraints tends to increase overall growth (see the last term in (12)), and therefore also average welfare. Second, with concave (logarithmic) utility functions, average welfare increases whenever individual consumptions (of c i t and k i t+1 ) are distributed more equally. Equivalently here, this captures the effect of skewness: given m t , a higher ∆ 2 t implies a higher per capita income ln y t = m t + ∆ 2 t /2, making redistribution more attractive for the median voter, and more generally at any given level of k i t . From this analysis it easily follows that agent i's preferred tax rate, obtained as the unique solution τ i t < 1 to the quadratic equation (15), decreases with his endowment k i t and increases with the ex-ante benefits from redistribution Bv 2 . Similarly,¯τ i t¯d ecreases with 1/η, as a more elastic labor supply magnifies the distortions that result from redistributive policies -whether progressive, τ > 0, or regressive, τ < 0.
I now turn from the preferences of different classes of voters to their political power or influence over the process that determines the actual τ t . Even in advanced democracies, poor and less educated individuals have a lower propensity to register, turn out to vote and give political contributions, than better-off ones.
For voting itself the tendency is relatively moderate, whereas for contributing to campaigns it is drastic.
Even for political activities that are time-rather than money-intensive, such as writing to Congress, attending meetings, trying to convince others, etc., the propensity to participate rises sharply with income and education. These facts are documented for instance in Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) , while Bartels (2002) provides a striking study of how they translate into disproportionate political influence. Studying the roll calls of US senators in three Congresses he finds that their votes are more responsive, by a factor ranging from 3 to 15, to the views of their constituents located the 75 th income percentile than to those of the 25 th ; and again more responsive, by a factor of 2 to 3, to the views of the 99 th percentile than to those of the 75 th . In less developed countries there is also extensive vote-buying, clientelism, intimidation and the like, which are likely to result in even more bias.
To summarize this political influence of human and financial wealth in a simple manner I shall assume that the pivotal voter is located at the 100 × p * -th percentile of the distribution, where the critical level p * can be any number in [0, 1] . A perfect democracy corresponds to p * = 1/2, while an imperfect one where participation or influence rises with social status corresponds to p
where Φ(·) denotes the c.d.f. of a standard normal. I shall refer to λ as the degree of wealth bias in the political system, and focus on the empirically relevant case where λ > 0. 22 Given the location of the pivotal voter, the policy outcome is simply obtained by setting ln k i t − m t = λ∆ t in the first-order condition ∂U i t /∂τ = 0. This yields the quadratic equation:
When labor supply is inelastic (1/η = 0), it is immediately apparent that this equilibrium tax rate is U -shaped in ∆ t , and minimized where γ 2 ∆ 2 = Bv 2 . This is true more generally.
Proposition 3 The rate of redistribution τ t = T (∆ t ) chosen in generation t is such that:
1) τ t increases with the ex-ante efficiency gain from redistribution Bv 2 , and decreases with the political influence of wealth, λ.
2) |τ t | decreases with the elasticity of labor supply 1/η.
3) τ t is U-shaped with respect to inequality ∆ t . It starts at the ex-ante optimal rate T (0) > 0, declines to a minimum at some ∆ > 0, then rises back towards T (∞) = 1. The larger Bv 2 , the wider the range
The first two results show that equilibrium policy depends on the costs and benefits of redistribution and on the allocation of political influence in a sensible manner. The third one confirms the key insight that efficient redistributions may decrease with inequality; more specifically, it yields the U-shaped function Figure 2 . The underlying intuition is simple, and very general: a) when distributional conflict γ∆ is small enough relative to the ex-ante efficiency gains Bv 2 , there is widespread support for the redistributive policy, so its equilibrium level is high; b) as inequality rises, so does the proportion of agents rich enough to be net losers from the policy, who will block all but relatively low levels of τ t ; c) at still higher levels of inequality, the standard skewness effect eventually dominates: there are so many poor that they impose high redistribution, even when it is very inefficient.
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It is now well-recognized that the standard median-voter model's prediction of a positive effect of inequality on redistribution fails to explain the empirical patterns actually observed, both across countries (see, e.g., Perotti (1996) , Bénabou (1996a Bénabou ( , 2000 , Alesina et al. (2002) ) and within them (see Rodriguez in fact negative (Pineda and Rodriguez (2000) . The present framework explains how and when greater inequality will indeed reduce redistribution, or even result in regressive policies -both in the short run (Proposition 3) and in the long-run, when both are endogenous (Proposition 4 below). Furthermore, the distinctive non-monotonic relationship predicted by the model turns out to have empirical support: in tests using cross-country data, Figini (1999) 
II Sustainable Social Contracts A Dynamics and Steady States
The joint evolution of inequality and policy is described by the recursive dynamical system:
where T (∆ t ) is given by Proposition 3 and D( ∆ t , τ t ) by (11). Under a time-invariant policy, in particular, long-run inequality decreases with redistribution:
A steady-state equilibrium is an intersection of this downward-sloping locus, ∆ = D(τ ), with the U-shaped curve τ = T (∆), as illustrated in Figure 2 . The following key proposition identifies the conditions under which multiple intersections occur.
Proposition 4 Let 1 − α < 2βγ. When the normalized efficiency gain B is below some critical value B there is a unique, stable, steady-state. When B > B, on the other hand, there exist λ andλ with 0 < λ <λ, such that: λ] there are (at least) two stable steady states. 2) For λ < λ or λ >λ the steady-state is unique.
These results can shed light on a number of important issues and puzzles raised in the introduction.
First, they explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can nonetheless sustain very different redistributive institutions, such as a European-style welfare state and a US-style laissez-faire social contract. Notably, these two societies cannot be Pareto ranked. Recall also that τ t can be equally interpreted as describing tax-and-transfer policy, labor market regulation, or (with some minor changes) education finance policy. Moreover, it is clear that the model's key mechanism makes these multiple dimensions of policy complementary, so that they will tend to covary positively across countries, as indeed they do empirically. A more egalitarian education system, for instance, tends to reduce income inequality, which in turn increases political support for fiscal redistribution or labor-earnings compression -and vice-versa. Summarizing a large collective research project on Sweden, Freeman (1995) emphasizes the presence of such complementarities, describing "a highly interrelated welfare state and economy in which many parts fit together (be they subsidies, taxes, wage compression etc.)".
Second, the two conditions required for multiplicity embody very general intuitions that are easily understood in the context of Figure 2 . To start with, the ex-ante welfare benefits of redistribution must be high enough, relative to the costs. 25 Otherwise the T curve will be upward-sloping except over a very narrow initial range, and consequently have a unique intersection with the D curve; economically speaking, we would be close to the standard, complete-markets case. In addition, the political power of the wealthy must lie in some intermediate range, otherwise the T curve will lie too high or too low relative to the D curve, and again there will be a unique intersection, with high inequality and low redistribution, or vice-versa.
Third, while in the short-run the relationship is non-monotonic, there emerges in the long-run a negative correlation between inequality and redistribution, as indeed one observes between the United States and Europe, or among advanced countries in general (Pineda and Rodriguez (2000) ).
Fourth, history matters in an important and plausible way: temporary shocks to the distribution of wealth (immigration, educational discrimination, demand shifts) as well as to the political system (slavery, voting rights restrictions) can permanently move society from one equilibrium to the other, or more generally have long-lasting effects on inequality, growth, and institutions. In particular, the model provides a formalization of Engerman and Sokoloff's (1998) 
thesis about the historical origins of South and North
America's very different development paths, which they trace back to the former set of New World colonies having had much higher initial inequality ∆ 0 , and a much more concentrated power structure λ 0 , than the latter.
26
Finally, the model also shows that different sources of inequality have different effects on redistributive institutions -which, in particular, sheds doubt on the possibility of empirically estimating a catch-all relationship between inequality and redistribution, or inequality and growth. Indeed, one can show (provided 25 The claim with respect to the benefits is clear from Proposition 4; with respect to the costs one can show, under additional technical assumptions, that the threshold B shifts up as the labor supply elasticity 1/η rises. 26 This, in turn, was due to reasons linked to the technologies required for the different goods these colonies were producing -a point I shall come back to in Section III.A. 1/η is not too large) that the threshold for multiplicity B is a decreasing function of the variance ratio v 2 /w 2 , with lim v/w→0 (B) = +∞ and lim v/w→+∞ (B) = 0. Quite intuitively, income uncertainty interacts with the incompleteness in insurance and credit markets in generating ex ante efficiency gains from redistribution, as reflected by the term Bv 2 in (17). By contrast, a greater variance w 2 of the endowments that agents receive prior to choosing policy increases the distributional conflict between identifiable losers and gainers from the policy. Thus, whereas an increase in the variability of sectoral shocks (similar to v 2 ) will lead to an expansion of the welfare state, a surge in immigration that results in a greater heterogeneity of the population (similar to a rise in w 2 ) can easily lead to cutbacks, or even a large-scale dismantling. We shall observe similar effects when studying the political implications of skill-biased technical change.
B Which Societies Grow Faster?
As mentioned earlier, the steady states corresponding to different social contracts are not Pareto-rankable:
rich enough agents always prefer a more laissez-faire society, while those who are poor enough always want more of a welfare state. One may still ask, however, how these two social models compare in terms of aggregate growth. This question is important first for its policy content, and second to know whether one should expect any empirical relationship between inequality and growth, when account is taken of the fact that both are endogenous. The answer hinges on the basic tradeoff, discussed earlier, between the distortions induced by redistribution and its beneficial effect on credit-constraints (magnified, in the long run, by the fact that it also reduces income inequality γ∆ ∞ ). This is made clear by the following results, which apply equally in the short and in the long run.
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Proposition 5 Compared to a more laissez-faire alternative τ 0 , a more redistributive social contract τ > τ 0 is associated with lower inequality, and 1) has higher growth when tax distortions are small (1/η ≈ 0) relative to those induced by credit constraints on the accumulation of human capital (βγ < 1);
2) has lower growth when tax distortions are high (1/η > 0) and the credit-constraint effect is weak
The first scenario, of "growth-enhancing redistributions", seems most relevant for developing countries, where capital markets are less well-functioning, and for redistribution through public investments in human capital and health. One may contrast here the paths followed by East Asia and Latin America in those respects. The result may also help understand why regression estimates of the effects of social and educational transfers on growth are often significantly positive, or at least rarely significantly negative.
The second, Eurosclerosis" scenario can account for why Europeans consistently choose more social insurance than Americans -at the cost of higher unemployment and slower growth -even though they are not necessarily more risk-averse. The intuition is that, in more homogenous societies, there is less erosion of the consensus over social insurance mechanisms which, ex-ante, would be valued enough to compensate for lesser growth prospects.
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Putting the two cases together, finally, Proposition 5 can also be related to the empirical findings of Barro (2000) that inequality tends to be negatively associated with subsequent growth in poor countries, but positively associated with it in richer ones. To the extent that poor countries are also those where credit markets are least developed, Proposition 5 predicts that inequality-reducing policies will give rise to just such a dichotomy. A Exogenous Technical Change and the Viability of the Welfare State I first examine here how technical or organizational change that increases the return to human capital affects redistributive institutions. This policy response represents an additional channel through which technological evolutions affect the income distribution, in addition to their direct impact via the wage structure. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of an increase in γ, the coefficient on human capital in the production and earnings function (1). As will from now on be made explicit in the notation, this affects both of the key curves describing the inequality-redistribution nexus: i) The intergenerational-transmission locus ∆ = D(τ ; γ) shifts up, and becomes less steep: for given human capital inequality ∆ t and policy τ there is more inequality in incomes γ∆ t , hence also in investments, and consequently more inequality of human capital (and of course income) in all subsequent periods.
III Technology and the Social Contract
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ii) The policy locus τ = T (γ∆) shifts down over [0, ∆), and up over (∆, +∞) : since what matters for the political outcome is income inequality γ∆ (see (17), an increase in γ for given ∆ has the same U-shaped effect on redistribution as an increase in ∆ for given γ -initially lowering τ , then raising it.
Figure 3 directly yields a local analysis of the more egalitarian, welfare-state equilibrium -and more generally, of any steady state that occurs along the declining portion of the T locus.
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Proposition 6 Let (∆, τ, γ) be such that (∆, τ) is a stable steady state under the technology γ, with ∆ < ∆(Bv 2 ; γ). A marginal increase in γ results in higher long run human capital and income inequality, as well as in less redistribution.
29 Recall that a worker's human capital reflects his individual ability, family background, and parental investment in education:
The kind of technical change considered here raises the return to all three components of k i t equally. In Galor and Tsiddon (1997) by contrast, major innovations raise the relative return to pure ability, while subsequent learning-by-doing innovations raise the relative return to inherited human capital. In Galor and Moav (2000) human capital is also sector-specific, and therefore eroded by new technologies, to an extent that decreases with individual ability. In these models technological innovations can thus raise as well as lower integenerational mobility. 30 For steady-states that occur on the rising part, local comparative statics are ambiguous. Note, however, that in versions of the model where power inequality rises with income or human wealth inequality -meaning that λ increases with ∆ (see footnote 21)-the declining portion of the locus is wider and the increasing portion reduced, making it easier to rule out such equilibria. For instance, if political power ω i is proportional to (y i ) λ -e.g., "one dollar, one vote" for λ = 1− then λ is simply replaced by λ∆ everywhere. As seen from (17), for 1/η = 0 the T (γ∆) curve is then decreasing throughout.
The policy response thus amplifies the direct effect of skill-biased technical progress on disposable incomes -and, over time, on the distributions of human capital and earnings. Figure 3 also suggests that it can have, in the long run, much more drastic consequences for redistributive institutions: starting from a situation with multiple steady states, an increase in γ tends to undermine the sustainability of the "Welfare State" equilibrium. Similarly, we shall see that starting from a configuration with a single "Welfare-State" it can make a second, "Laissez-Faire" equilibrium appear. Such a global analysis is potentially quite complicated, however, since in general there may be more than two stable equilibria, and some may also occur in the upward-sloping portion of the τ = T (γ∆) locus, where the policy response has a dampening rather than an amplifying effect on inequality. To demonstrate the most interesting insights, I shall therefore impose some simplifying assumptions. First, I restrict voters to a choice between only two policies:
• A generous "Welfare State" social contract, corresponding to a relatively high rate of redistribution τ ∈ (0, 1);
• A more "Laissez Faire" social contract, corresponding to a relatively low rate of redistribution τ ∈ (0,τ ).
Once again, τ can be interpreted as corresponding to either fiscal redistribution, wage compression through labor market regulation, or education finance progressivity. To further simplify the problem I abstract from labor supply distortions (1/η = 0) and assume that B is large enough that both potential steady states are always on the downward-sloping part of the τ = T (∆γ) curve, which is the one of most interest.
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Given an initial distribution of human capital ∆ t , the more redistributive policy τ t =τ is adopted over
for at least a critical fraction p * ≡ Φ(λ) of the population. Note from (15) that with 1/η = 0 , ∂U i t /∂τ t is linear in τ t , so the preceding inequality evaluated at ln k i t = m t + λ∆ t takes the form:
We first see that the political influence of wealth must not be too large, compared to the aggregate welfare gain from redistribution relative to laissez faire (net of the deadweight loss, which I am here abstracting from). Second, preexisting income inequality raises the hurdle that public policy must overcome, as the ex-ante benefit term Bv 2 is divided by γ∆ t . This effect impedes the adoption of more redistributive 31 The required condition appears in Proposition 7. It is thus not inevitably the case that skill-biased technical progress leads to a retrenchment of redistributive institutions; the model allows for the reverse case, for steady-states that occur on the rising part of the T locus. The case on which I focus, however, appears to be the most relevant for recent trends, and in any case is the more robust, since: i) when multiple steady-states exist, there is always at least one the declining part; ii) in simple and plausible variants of the model, the T locus is decreasing throughout (see footnote 30).
institutions (τ =τ ) where they had not previously been in place, because of the greater divergence of interests that results over time from a more laissez-faire system (τ = τ ). Pushing in the other directionnamely, intensifying the demand for redistribution as inequality rises-are the effects of skewness and initial credit-constraints, reflected in the additive term γ∆ t . As a result of these offsetting forces, the right-hand side of (20) is U-shaped in γ∆ t . To focus on the long-run, let us now replace human capital inequality ∆ t with its asymptotic value under a technology γ and a constant policy τ -namely, by (11):
which is the long-run inequality in human capital resulting from a constant policy τ and technology γ.
Given γ, the policy-inequality pair (τ , D(τ , γ)) is thus a politico-economic steady state if:
Conversely, the laissez-faire configuration (τ , D(τ , γ)) is a politico-economic steady state given γ if:
The two regimes coexist if and only if λ(γ; B) <λ(γ; B), or:
We thus obtain here the analogue, for a discrete policy choice, of Proposition 4: multiplicity requires that B be large enough compared to income inequality (and, in general, to 1/η),
and that the wealth bias λ be neither too high nor too low, given the technology γ : λ ∈ £ λ,λ ¤ , defined by (22)- (23). 32 Now, furthermore, we shall see that (under appropriate conditions) the skill bias γ must also be neither too high nor too low, given λ. This result is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Proposition 7 Let 1/η = 0 and Bv 2 > γ max · D(τ , γ max ), where γ max ≡ (1 − α)/β. There exist two skill-bias thresholds γ(λ; B) <γ(λ; B), both decreasing in λ and increasing in B, such that:
32 Note also that as B increases both λ andλ rise, but (24) shows that the interval [λ,λ] widens. When (25) does not hold, on the other hand, we haveλ < λ. For λ / ∈ [λ, λ] there is a unique steady-state, but for λ ∈ [λ, λ] the economy can instead be shown to cycle between the two regimes, as in Gradstein and Justman (1997) . This feature reflects the restriction of policy to a binary choice. i) for γ < γ(λ; B), the unique steady state corresponds to the welfare-state outcome (τ , D(τ , γ));
ii) for γ ∈ £ γ(λ; B),γ(λ; B) ¤ , both (τ, D(τ, γ)) and (τ , D(τ , γ)) are stable steady states;
iii) for γ ∈ [γ(λ; B), γ max ], the unique steady state is laissez-faire, (τ , D(τ , γ)).
These results have a number of important implications.
First, they confirm that the Welfare State becomes unsustainable when technology becomes too skillbiased; and, conversely, that multiple social contracts can coexist only when γ is in some intermediate range. 33 We see here again at work the general insight that sources of heterogeneity that are predictable on the basis of of initial endowments -a greater variance of abilities, w 2 , as discussed earlier, or greater skill bias γ, as here-push equilibrium institutions towards less redistribution.
Second, Proposition 7 also reveals interesting interactions between the production and political "technologies". As seen on Figure 4 , in a country with relatively little wealth bias the welfare state is -for better of for worse-much more "immune" to skill-biased technical change than in one where λ is high. Similarly, a given change in the political system will have very different effects on redistributive institutions, depending on how skill-biased the technology is. Finally, the "surest way" to set out on a course of persistently high inequality and inefficiently regressive (or insufficiently progressive) institutions is to start out with both a production structure that generates high wage inequality, and a political system marked by a high 33 Hassler et al. (2003) also show that the "welfare-state" equilibrium in their model no longer exists above a certain level of skill bias. The mechanism is quite different, however: it is the anticipation of a higher skill premium that causes more agents to invest in education -to the point where, ex-post, a majority of them end up with high incomes (the distribution is negatively skewed), and therefore oppose redistribution.
degree of bias. As demonstrated by Engerman and Sokoloff (1995) , such were the initial conditions found in the plantation-based and natural-resource based colonies of Central and South America in the 16 th and 17 th centuries -in contrast to those of North America, where agriculture was not subject to significant increasing returns to scale, and initial institutions were much less oligarchic.
Third, our result can also be related to that of Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) , who show that skill-biased technical progress may cause a decline in unionization. While their model is quite different, it shares the two key features emphasized in previous sections. First, relatively rich agents -namely skilled workers-are pivotal, in the sense that it is their willingness to leave or avoid the unionized sector that limits the extent of wage compression. Second, in making this mobility decision -voting with their feetthey trade off redistributive losses (unions redistribute towards unskilled workers, who are a majority in the unionized sector) against ex-ante efficiency benefits: unions provide insurance through wage-sharing and / or a safeguard against the "holdup" by firms of workers' specific human capital investments; even when they play no such role, leaving the unionized sector involves mobility costs. Consequently, when skill-biased technical change makes the interests of the two classes of workers too divergent, redistributive institutions -here, union participation-will decline. Moreover, this can happen inefficiently.
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B Skills, Technology, and Income Inequality I now turn to the reverse mechanism and examine how inequality itself feeds back onto the nature of technical change, making γ endogenous. Recognizing that individuals do not produce in isolation, I model production interactions with a simple specialization structure where workers perform complementary tasks.
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Final output is produced by competitive firms, using a continuum of differentiated intermediate inputs:
where x t (s) denotes the quantity of input s, z t (s) an i.i.d. sectoral shock, and A t a TFP parameter.
Workers specialize in a single good, which they produce using their human capital and labor. Since they face downward-sloping demand curves each selects a different task, s(i) = i, and produces x 
The corresponding hourly wages are ω Figure 4 that a minor change in γ can trigger a significant decline in redistribution fromτ to τ , and recall from Proposition 5 that the latter can easily lead to lower aggregate growth. The same is clearly true for average welfare, e.g. when 1/η = 0.
35 Building on those in Bénabou (1996) and Tamura (1992) , themselves based on Romer (1987) .
This earnings function is exactly the same as in previous sections (see (1)), with
except for the extra TFP factorÃ t ≡ A 
Keeping average human capital constant, the loss e −∆ 2 t /2σ makes apparent the productivity costs imposed by (excessive) heterogeneity of the labor force: poorly educated, insufficiently skilled production and clerical workers drag down the productivity of engineers, managers, scientists, etc. We also see that a production technology with greater substitutability between the tasks performed by different types of workers reduces these costs of skill disparities (Bénabou (1996) , Grossman and Maggi (2000) ). Indeed, this greater flexibility allows firms to more easily substitute towards the more productive workers, and conversely reduce their dependence on low-skill labor. This may be achieved by internal retooling, reorganization, or by outsourcing certain activities to competitive subcontractors. 37 One can also think of a higher σ as a more discriminating search technology, resulting in more assortative matching between workers -that is, in a more segregated production structure (Kremer and Maskin (1996) , (2003)).
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Naturally, production processes with less complementarity between workers of different skills result in greater inequality of wages and incomes, as they have the effect of uncoupling their marginal products:
36 Note again the role of the overlapping-generations structure with "imperfect" altruism in simplifying the voting problem. Observe also that τ t can now, as claimed earlier, be interpreted as the extent of wage income compression, i.e. the degree of progressivity in the mapping (defined by (6)) from workers' true marginal revenue products y i t (given by (28)) to the labor earning they actually receive,ŷ i t . 37 For evidence on organizational change, see for instance Caroli and Van Reenen (1999) . 38 When labor supply is endogenous, 1/η > 0, a higher σ also induces workers to increase their labor supply, as they face a less elastic demand curve: by Proposition 1, l t = χ (1 − τ t ) 1/η , with now γ = (σ − 1)/σ. This effect is independent of any issues of skill heterogeneity or wage inequality, however.
C Technological Choice and Endogenous Flexibility
More flexible technologies and production processes require costly investments or reorganizations. Moreover, their benefits to an individual firm are endogenous even in the short run (i.e., given the skill composition of the labor force), as they depend on the decisions of other firms, which affect the wage structure.
I therefore now model firms' choices of technology or organizational form, proposing a new and very simple formulation that highlights the roles of heterogeneity and flexibility. In every period, firms have access to a menu of potential technologies with different elasticities of substitution σ ∈ [1, +∞) and associated costs c(σ); the latter result in a TFP factor A(σ) = e −c(σ) , with c 0 > 0 and c 00 > 0. 39 Given the distribution of workers' human capital ln k i t ∼ N (m, ∆ 2 t ) and the technology σ t used by its competitors, each firm chooses its own technologyσ as a best response. This results in a marginal cost of
Substituting from (27) for the equilibrium input prices p i t , and normalizing by the other firms' marginal cost (see the proof of Proposition 8), the firm's relative marginal cost is equal to:
The first-order condition for this convex minimization problem is
Intuitively, the marginal benefit of flexibility rises with the variability of skills in the labor force, but decreases with the degree to which other firms choose technologies that allow them to more easily substitute toward better workers, since in doing so they drive up the skill premium.
Proposition 8 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in technology choice. The more heterogenous the workforce, the more flexible and skill-biased the technology used by firms:
This result has several interesting implications.
A first one is the magnification of wage inequality: the return to human capital ∂ ln ω i t /∂ ln k i t = (σ t −1)/σ t is higher where the labor force is more heterogenous, further amplifying wage differentials across educational levels. This simple prediction could be tested empirically across countries and / or time periods.
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A second implication is the potential for "immiserizing technological choices". Proposition 8 states that σ increases with ∆; conversely, because of credit constraints, human capital heterogeneity itself rises over time with γ = (σ − 1)/σ, and in the long-run ∆ = D(τ, γ), which is increasing in γ. Could these two mechanisms reinforce each other to the point of resulting in multiple steady states even under a fixed policy -whether activist or laissez-faire-and even though, once again, there are no non-convexities in the model?
The idea is that a high degree of skill bias results in very low wages for unskilled workers, severely limiting the extent to which they can invest in human capital (for themselves or their children). This, in turn, leads firms to again choose a very flexible, skill-biased technology in the next period, and so on. Conversely, a less skilled-biased technology and a less dispersed distribution of human wealth could be self-sustaining.
To examine this possibility, note first that:
by Proposition 8, while (21) yields
where, as usual, γ = (σ − 1)/σ. If the product of these two derivatives is everywhere less than 1, there is a unique equilibrium. If it exceeds 1 for some value of σ, on the other hand, there may be multiplicity. It is easily verified that ∂D(τ, γ)/∂ ln σ < 1 if and only if
The first term is always less than one (or else inequality explodes; moreover, this can never occur when τ is 40 Kremer and Maskin (1996) present evidence for a related intervening mechanism (similar to ∂σ * /∂∆ > 0 in this model), although not for how educational returns and wage inequality are ultimately affected. They show that in US states characterized by greater human capital inequality, there is more segregation of workers by skills (the ratio of within-to between-plant skill dispersion is lower). endogenously chosen), but the second need not be, especially if τ < 0. We can thus conclude that the kind of "technology-inequality trap" described above becomes a real possibility under regressive or insufficiently progressive policies. In particular, education systems that result in significant resource disparities between students, such as private financing or local (property-tax based) school funding as in the United States, are fertile ground for the joint emergence of highly skill-biased production processes and a persistently skewed skill distribution. Furthermore, as we shall see below, endogenizing τ only increases the likelihood of such outcomes, since the degree of redistribution tends to fall with inequality.
A third point is that even under the less extreme conditions where no such trap exists, firms' decisions involve a dynamic externality that tends to result in excessively skill-biased or flexible technologies. Indeed, each takes the distribution of skills it faces as given but neglects the effects of its own flexibility on workers' human capital investments, and therefore on subsequent distributions. More specifically, while a marginal change in σ t has only second-order effects on the current production costs faced by firms, it has three first-order effects on growth.
41 First, a lower σ t would reduce current income inequality γ t ∆ t , which is growth-enhancing given the presence of credit constraints. This would in turn lower the skill disparities ∆ t+k that firms will face in the future, as well as the costs c (σ * (∆ t+k )) they will bear to adapt to this heterogeneity. Although γ t = (σ t − 1)/σ t also affects in a somewhat complex way the concavity of educational investment (where it interacts with α, β and τ t ), it is easy to identify cases where growth in every period would be higher if firms collectively chose less skill-biased technologies.
For instance, let α = 0, β = 1, and 1/η = 0 (inelastic labor supply), and fix any constant policy τ ; the interactions of technology choice and policy decisions will be examined in the next section. In the resulting steady state, the degree of flexibility and the dispersion in skills are given by the two equations
The corresponding asymptotic growth rate is computed in the appendix, and equals:
A marginal reduction in σ from its equilibrium value, if it were permanently implemented by all firms, would then increase steady-state growth, since:
In this expression the first two terms cancel out by the first-order condition (34), while the last one reflects 41 As explained in footnote 38, when 1/η > 0 a higher σt also raises the return to labor supply δt = (σt − 1)/σt, inducing all agents to work more. 42 I assume here that (37) holds, so that this steady-state is unique (given τ ), although this is inessential to the argument. the dynamic externality. The above result holds more generally for any equilibrium path that is either near the steady state, or such that σ t converges to its long-run value from above (see the appendix).
Inefficient choices of technology or firm organization arise in a number of models where market imperfections create an excessive role for the distribution of financial or human wealth to shape the structure of production, with the result of exacerbating inequality and making it more persistent. In Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Newman and Legros (1998) , for instance, the moral-hazard problem affecting entrepreneurship combines with an unequal wealth distribution in forcing too many agents to work for low wages in large firms, rather than setting up their own. In Vindigni (2002) an extreme example of the technology trap studied above occurs, as firms' decisions (choosing the arrival rate of exogenously skill-biased innovations)
can permanently confine some dynasties of workers below the fixed income threshold required to invest in human capital. 43 In Grossman (2004) , a high variance of human capital in the labor force increases the incentives of the most skilled agents to work in sectors where individual productivity is observable, rather than in those where output is team-determined; because they fail to internalize the spillovers they would have on team productivity, the resulting occupational segregation is inefficiently high.
IV Endogenous Institutions and Endogenous Technology
Combining the main mechanisms analyzed in previous sections yields a model where the distribution of human capital, the technologies used by firms and the policy implemented by the state are all endogenous -as they are in reality. The dynamical system governing the economy's evolution remains recursive:
where
represents the technology outcome given by Proposition 8, T (γ∆) the policy outcome given by Proposition 3, and D(∆, τ, γ) the transmission of human capital inequality given in Proposition 2. The resulting aggregate growth rate, ln(y t+1 /y t ) = g(τ t , ∆ t , γ t ), follows from Proposition 2. Finally, steady states are solutions to the fixed-point equation
This structure makes clear the presence of important multiplier effects: a transitory shock affecting inequality (e.g., more idiosyncratic uncertainty v 2 ) or the political system (a higher λ) will be amplified through technology decisions, the policy choice, and the intergenerational transmission mechanism, and may thus have considerable long-term consequences. 44 Most importantly, in accounting for changes in inequality one can no longer treat technological and institutional factors as separate, competing explanations: both are jointly determined, and complementary. The model thus shows how, in the words of Freeman (1995) , one needs to think of "the Welfare State as a system".
To demonstrate these points I shall assume from here on a piecewise-linear technological frontier.
Flexibility is free up to σ L , then has a marginal cost of M > 0, up to a maximum level σ H > σ L :
I will denote γ i = (σ i − 1)/σ i , i ∈ {L, H}. The analogue of Proposition 8 in this case is very simple, as the first order condition in a symmetric equilibrium involves the comparison:
The unique symmetric outcome is thus
, on the other hand, firms mix between σ L and σ H , in proportions such that the resulting factor prices make each one indifferent; this equilibrium will be denoted σ LH .
45 Focussing now on technology-inequality steady states, for any τ ≤ 1 and σ ≥ 1 the marginal benefit of flexibility (right-hand-side of (43)) equals
where D(τ , γ) is the asymptotic variance under the policy τ and return to skill γ, given by (21). Thus, under any time-invariant policy τ, whether exogenous or endogenous:
it is the mixed-strategy outcome σ LH ;
there are three technological steady states:
44 The long-run multiplier for any shock to the D function (e.g., a change in w 2 ) is µ ≡
. Similarly, the long-run effects on inequality of a shock to the T function (e.g., a change in λ) its is µ · D 2 (∂T/∂λ). 45 It is not necessary to provide here the full characterization of this mixed-strategy equilibrium. The response of technology and policy to a decline in the cost of flexibility (case (i)).
Under each range of M appears the unique (σ, τ ) such that (σ, ∆ = D(τ ; 1 − 1/σ)) is a stable steady state given τ and M. The subset reached via solid lines corresponds to the stable steady-states in (σ, ∆, τ) jointly, when policy is endogenous as well.
σ L , σ H , and σ LH ; the first two are stable, the third one unstable.
Furthermore, since R(τ, σ) is decreasing in τ, we have:
Proposition 9 ii) R(τ , σ L ) < R(τ , σ H ), implying that for either policy τ ∈ {τ ,τ } there is a range of M 's where multiple technologies are sustainable. The message is essentially the same in both cases, showing how a world-wide shift in the set of feasible technologies can result in different evolutions of both production processes and the skill premium across countries. In particular, the model can help explain why skill-biased technical change and reorganization occurred first, and to a greater extent, in the United States compared to Europe -and within Europe, more so in England than on the Continent.
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The response of technology and policy to a decline in the cost of flexibility (case (ii)).
Under each range of M appear the values of (σ, τ ) such that (σ, ∆ = D(τ ; 1 − 1/σ)) is a stable steady state given τ and M. The subset reached via solid lines corresponds to the stable steady-states in (σ, ∆, τ) jointly, when policy is endogenous as well.
Indeed, consider two countries, C 1 and C 2 , that are initially identical in all respects, including both using the technology σ L , except that one is in a laissez-faire equilibrium, τ = τ , and the other in a welfare state, τ =τ . Suppose now that the technological frontier gradually flattens (M declines), meaning that flexibility becomes cheaper to achieve. As shown on Figures 5-6 , the more skill-biased technology σ H becomes (all or part of) another feasible equilibrium in C 1 before it does in C 2 ; similarly, σ L first ceases to be viable (by itself or as part of a mixed equilibrium) in the laissez-faire country, while it is still sustainable in the more redistributive one.
Going further, there are in fact reciprocal interactions between the economy's technology response and policy response to shocks. Proposition 9 and Figures 5-6 show that feasible new technologies are not implemented unless institutions are sufficiently inegalitarian. But, conversely, the occurrence of technical change alters these same institutions, as seen in Proposition 7. Indeed, suppose that:
whereλ and λ were defined in (22)-(23). These inequalities imply that: i) under the technology σ L , both social contracts τ andτ are political steady states; ii) under σ H ,τ is a political steady state, while τ is one if and only if we also have λ <λ(γ H ; B).
When this last inequality holds, the set of stable politico-economico-technological steady states (with endogenous τ, ∆ and σ) is the same as described on Figures 5-6. When λ >λ(γ H ; B), however, the more redistributive social contractτ is not politically sustainable under the amount of inequality that results, in the long run, from the technology σ H . Therefore one must remove from the set of steady states on each figure the "branches" corresponding to this outcome; these are indicated by the dashed lines. The Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) , by contrast, agents with different vintages of human capital vote directly on whether or not to allow the adoption of new technologies by firms. 
only the egalitarian social contract and the egalitarian technology, or the inegalitarian social contract and inegalitarian technology, are mutually compatible.
V Exporting Inequality: Spillovers Between Social Contracts
The model also allows us to think about spillovers between national policies or institutions, operating via technological and organizational diffusion. The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 7 , which shows how the social contract in Country 2 can, over time, be affected by technological or even purely political shifts in Country 1, propagated along the channels indicated by the solid lines on the diagram.
As seen in the previous section, firms operating in countries with more laissez-faire fiscal, educational or labor market policies have greater incentives to develop and adopt low-complementarity production processes. Suppose now that the cost of imitating, adapting or copying a more flexible technology or organizational form, once it has been developed and implemented elsewhere, is lower than the cost of innovation; in terms of the model, it is m < M. This lower marginal cost may for instance reflect, as in Acemoglu (1998) , an imperfect international enforcement of property rights over technological or organizational innovations. As we shall see, redistributive institutions in one country will then be significantly affected, perhaps even completely undermined, by technological or political changes occurring in another.
48 48 As mentioned earlier I abstract here from international trade, which could be yet another channel of transmission. See Grossman and Maggi (2000) , Grossman (2004) or Thoenig and Verdier (2003) for papers that study the effects of trade openness on technical and organizational change, although not their political economy implications.
I shall focus here on parameter configurations that satisfy the following conditions:
which imply in particular that M > M 0 > m. As shown as part of Proposition 10 below, these conditions also ensure that the technology σ L allows for both social contracts τ andτ, and conversely that σ L is an equilibrium technology under both social contracts (no firm wants to switch to σ H ).
Proposition 10 Assume that conditions (45)- (47) are satisfied, and consider two countries, C 1 and C 2 , that both start in steady state, with the same technology σ L . Suppose now that the cost of flexibility in country C 1 declines from M to M 0 .
1) If both C 1 and C 2 were initially in the more egalitarian of the two regimes compatible with σ L nothing happens, in the sense that (τ , γ L , D(τ, γ L )) remains a stable steady state for both countries.
2) If C 1 was initially in the more inegalitarian regime (τ , γ L , D(τ , γ L )), the unique long run outcome is for both countries to switch to the technology σ H , and for country C 2 to also adopt the more unequal social contract τ : the unique steady state for the two countries is now (τ , γ H , D(τ , γ H )).
The intuition is as follows. Even as M declines to M 0 , firms faced with the skill distribution D(τ, γ L ) resulting fromτ do not find it profitable to switch technology. Given the higher dispersion D(τ , γ L ) that prevails under τ , however, if country C 1 starts in this regime all firms there will eventually switch to technology σ H . 49 Next, given the lower cost of flexibility m to which firms in C 2 now have access through imitation, σ L is no longer viable there even underτ. And, in turn, with the higher income inequality that results in the long run from technology σ H , the only politically sustainable social contract is τ .
These results make clear how technological change (a shift in the frontier) has significant effects only when it is mediated through specific institutions -namely, which social contract C 1 had adopted; and, conversely, how under such conditions it will then affect institutions in other countries, namely here in C 2.
B A Shift in One Country's Political Institutions 
Proposition 11 Assume that conditions (48)- (49) are satisfied. Consider two countries, C 1 and C 2 , that both start in the egalitarian steady state, (τ , γ L , D(τ , γ L )), with the same technology σ L . Suppose now that the political influence of wealth in country C 1 rises from λ to λ 0 . The unique long run outcome is for both countries to switch to the technology σ H and the more unequal social contract τ , thus ending up at the steady state (τ , γ H , D(τ , γ H )).
As a result of the initial political shift, redistribution τ 1 (fiscal, educational, or via labor-market institutions) in country C 1 declines. This leads over time to a rise in human capital inequality ∆ 1 , to which firms respond by adopting more flexible, wage-disequalizing technologies, switching from σ L to σ H and further precipitating the shift fromτ to τ . Their counterparts in C 2 , which would not have developed such technologies by themselves, now find it profitable to copy them from C 1 . This results in a rise in income inequality γ 2 ∆ 2 in C 2 (and, over time, in human-capital inequality ∆ 2 itself) that ultimately leads to the unravelling of the Welfare State in that country as well.
VI Conclusion
This chapter offers a new, unified model to analyze the reciprocal interactions between the distribution of human wealth, technology, and redistributive institutions. It identifies in particular certain core mechanisms that allow alternative societal models to persist, as well as powerful forces pushing towards uniformization. Key among the former is the interplay of imperfections in asset markets and in the political system that can lead to multiple steady states where inequality and redistribution are negatively correlated. Among the latter is skill-biased technical change, which can potentially lead to the unravelling of the Welfare State. When technological or organizational form is endogenous, moreover, firms respond to greater human capital heterogeneity with more flexible technologies, further exacerbating income inequal-ity. The possibility for firms in different countries to thus choose technologies adapted to the local labor force can also make it easier to sustain multiple social models. The international diffusion of technology, however, implies that the more flexible, skill-biased technologies profitably developed in nations with greater inequality and less redistributive institutions may then be imitated by firms in other countries, thereby triggering a "chain reaction" that moves the whole system towards a common outcome that is more inegalitarian -technologically, economically, and politically speaking. Such international spillovers between national social contracts are important concerns in the debate over globalization, and warrant further research.
Conversely, given a tax rate τ we see from (43) that the technology σ L and associated γ L = (σ L −1)/σ L is a technological steady state when the slope of the technology frontier is M, which we denote as σ L ∈ T (τ ; M ), if and only if: A policy-technology combination (τ, σ) ∈ {τ, τ } × {σ L , σ H } is then a full steady-state if and only if τ ∈ P (σ; λ) and σ ∈ T (τ ; M ). Clearly, there are at most four stable steady-states (we restrict attention here to cases where the technology equilibrium is in pure strategies). We now proceed through a sequence of three claims, which together establish the proposition.
Claim 1: for a country facing the technological frontier M, the only steady states are (τ , σ L ) and (τ , σ L ). Indeed, the first inequality in (45) states that σ L ∈ T (τ ; M ) and this is easily seen to imply that σ L ∈ T (τ ; M ). Conversely, the second inequality states that σ H / ∈ T (τ ; M ) and this is easily seen to imply that σ L ∈ T (τ ; M ). Finally, the fact that λ(γ L ; B) < λ <λ(γ L ; B) due to (45) means that τ ∈ P (σ L ; λ)
andτ ∈ P (σ 0 L ; λ).
Claim 2: for a country facing the technological frontier M 0 , the only steady states are (τ , σ L ) and (τ , σ H ). Indeed, note first from (47) that R(τ, σ L ) < M 0 means that we still have σ L ∈ T (τ ; M 0 ); by contrast, M 0 < min {R(τ , σ L ), R(τ , σ H )} means that σ H ∈ T (τ ; M ) but σ L / ∈ T (τ ; M ). The only possible equilibria are thus (τ, σ L ), (τ , σ H ) and (τ , σ H ). Turning now to (45), the fact that λ <λ(γ L ; B) means thatτ ∈ P (σ 0 L ; λ); the fact that thatλ(γ H ; B) < λ, on the other hand, means that τ ∈ P (σ H ; λ) but τ / ∈ P (σ H ; λ). So only the first two of the three preceding configurations are full equilibria.
Claim 3: for a country facing the technological frontier m, the only steady state is (τ , σ H ). Observe from (47) that m satisfies all the same inequalities as M 0 , except that m < R(τ, σ L ) whereas R(τ, σ L ) < M 0 .
This means that whereas we had σ L ∈ T (τ ; M 0 ), we now have σ L / ∈ T (τ ; M 0 ). This rules out the equilibrium (τ, σ L ), leaving only (τ , σ H ). ¥ Proof of Proposition 11.
Claim 1: in the initial parameter configuration, (τ , σ L ) is a steady state (and even the only steadystate with policyτ ). Indeed, the fact thatλ(γ H ; B) < λ <λ(γ L ; B) means thatτ ∈ P(σ L ; λ), whereas τ / ∈ P(σ H ; λ). The rest of the claim follows from the fact σ L ∈ T (τ ; M ), since M > R(τ , σ L ). λ 0 >λ(γ L ; B) >λ(γ H ; B) we now haveτ / ∈ P(σ L ; λ 0 ) andτ / ∈ P(σ H ; λ 0 ), so there is no steady-state with policyτ. Moreover, since M < R(τ , σ L ) we have σ L / ∈ T (τ ; M ), so the only possible equilibrium is (τ , σ H ).
It is indeed an equilibrium, as M < R(τ , σ H ) means that σ H ∈ T (τ ; M ), whileλ(γ H ; B) < λ 0 means that τ ∈ P(σ H ; λ 0 ).
Claim 3: After C 1 has switched to the technology σ H , so that C 2 faces the technology frontier m, the only steady-state for C 2 is (τ , σ H ). First the fact m < R(τ , σ L ) < R(τ , σ L ) implies that (τ, σ L ) is no longer a technological equilibrium, and a fortiori neither is (τ , σ L ). Second, the fact m < min {R(τ , σ L ), R(τ , σ H )} means that the only technological equilibrium under policy τ is σ H . Finally, since λ >λ(γ H ; B), τ ∈ P(σ H ; λ) whereasτ / ∈ P(σ H ; λ), which concludes the proof. ¥
